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Abstract 
 
In New Zealand, excise taxes are levied on three commodity groups: alcohol, tobacco and 
petrol. The 2001 Tax Review, published by the New Zealand Treasury, argued that 
excises are inequitable and inefficient, and advised that these taxes should be removed 
and the revenue replaced by raising the standard rate of GST. This paper provides an 
empirical examination of these issues. First, the efficiency of New Zealand’s current 
system of indirect taxes is examined. The welfare and redistributive effects resulting from 
the revenue-neutral removal of excise taxes are then examined. Welfare and redistributive 
measures are computed for a range of demographic groups and total weekly expenditure 
levels. While the largest efficiency gains and reductions in inequality are observed for 
households with at least one smoker, the overall distributional implications of the 
proposed reforms are found to be small. 
. 
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Excise Taxation in New Zealand 
1 Introduction 
 
The indirect tax system in New Zealand consists of a broad-based Goods and Services 
Tax (GST) imposed at a single rate, plus excise taxes on three broad commodity groups: 
alcohol, tobacco and petrol.
3
 In the Treasury’s review of the tax system, McCleod et al. 
(2001) argued that excise taxes are inefficient at raising tax revenue and inequitable, 
being regressive in nature. They argued (2001, p.41) that, ‘the current excise and duty 
regime cannot readily be justified on conventional tax policy grounds. As a matter of tax 
principle the general revenue component of these taxes should be replaced by an 
increase in GST. At a minimum, the many anomalies in this area of the tax system should 
be subject to further review’. Their discussion did not include any evidence to support their 
assertions regarding efficiency or equity. This paper therefore explores the welfare and 
redistributive effects of excise taxes and the changes that may be expected to result from 
the revenue-neutral removal of excise taxes in New Zealand.  
A standard argument in favour of the higher taxation of the commodity groups that 
are subject to excise taxes is that they are ‘demerit goods’ and give rise to substantial 
external costs. McCleod et al. (2001) questioned these arguments, though information 
about externalities is extremely hard to obtain.
4
 The present paper concentrates on the 
welfare effects only; these may be compared with independent assessments of external 
effects.  
The analysis proceeds as follows. The welfare effects of the taxes arise as a result 
of the higher prices imposed on consumers, so it is necessary to evaluate the likely price 
changes produced by any tax reform. Section 2 describes the existing indirect tax system, 
and shows how the GST and excise taxes interact to influence final prices. The empirical 
analysis requires a method of computing the welfare changes and excess burdens, 
measured here in terms of Hicksian equivalent variations for a variety of demographic 
groups over a range of total expenditure levels. The method used here follows Creedy 
(1998a,b) and is applied to New Zealand Household Economic Survey (HES) data. The 
technical details are given briefly in the Appendix, while section 3 provides information 
about the data and the household groups considered. An important qualification is that the 
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 The annual revenue raised by excise taxes is approximately $4 billion.  
4
 For a case study of alcohol, see Barker (2002).   
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approach is partial equilibrium in nature: any changes to factor prices, and hence 
incomes, resulting from a tax policy change are ignored.  
Section 4 examines the effects of the current tax structure, where the price 
changes are those resulting from the imposition of the taxes. Two hypothetical reforms are 
then considered in section 5. In the first, the excise taxes that are currently levied on 
alcohol and tobacco are removed, but the petrol excise tax is retained. This is because 
different types of argument relate to these groups. Discussion of the petrol excise tax 
usually revolves around environmental considerations relating to the over-use of scarce 
resources, and pollution issues. Alcohol and tobacco excise taxes are usually justified on 
demerit good and externality grounds. In the second tax reform, the excise taxes on all 
three commodity groups are removed. For each reform, the standard GST rate that would 
be required to achieve revenue neutrality is obtained. In computing this GST rate, 
allowance is made for the consumption changes arising from tax and relative price 
changes. Welfare measures are reported for representative total expenditure levels within 
a large number of demographic groups. Measures of inequality are reported in section 6, 
which provides overall summary indications of the direction and extent of the redistributive 
effects of the reforms. The sensitivity of the results to adult equivalence scales and the 
degree of inequality aversion are also considered in section 6. Conclusions are in section 
7. 
2 The  Indirect  Tax  Structure 
 
The computation of welfare measures requires all existing indirect taxes to be specified in 
terms of their effective tax-exclusive ad valorem rates.
 5
 This is straightforward for the 
majority of commodity groups which attract only GST of 12.5 per cent. However, the 
translation between tax rates and effective ad valorem rates is more complex for the three 
commodity groups subject to excise taxes, since they are expressed in commodity units 
rather than values, and GST is then imposed on the excise-tax-inclusive price of the 
commodity.  
Let  E  denote the per unit excise tax, g  the GST rate, and 
0 P  the tax-exclusive 
price of the good. The total tax paid, T , on a unit of the commodity is defined by: 
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 The tax-exclusive tax rate is defined as the ratio of tax paid to the tax-exclusive price of the good, while the 
tax-inclusive tax rate is defined as the ratio of tax paid to the tax-inclusive price of the good.   
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Assuming that the full amount of the tax is passed forward to consumers, the tax-inclusive 
price of the good, 


























The effective tax-exclusive ad valorem tax rate, 
0 / tT P = , is therefore: 




= ++  (4) 
For example, in 2001 the petrol excise tax, E , was $0.343 per litre, and the 
proportional GST rate, g , was 0.125. Let the consumer price of petrol, 
1 P , be $1.08 per 
litre. Hence, from equation (3) the tax-exclusive price, 
0 P , was $0.617, and from equation 
(4) the effective tax-exclusive ad valorem tax rate on petrol, t , was 0.75 cents in the 
dollar.  
Due to estimation requirements it was not possible to retain all the separate and 
highly detailed commodity groups in the HES. Instead, these were consolidated into 22 
commodity groups. Where several HES groups were combined, a weighted average of 
the tax rates on the HES groups was taken to produce one effective ad valorem tax rate.
6
 
Table 1, based on details given in Young (2002), shows the commodity groups used and 
the effective tax-exclusive ad valorem tax rates for 2001. The group described as ‘Petrol’ 
actually combines petrol with diesel, CNG and LPG. Hence the appropriate tax rate for 
this combination requires a weighted average of petrol and other fuel taxes. The basic 
(year 2001) rate used for this group is 0.718, which is correspondingly lower than the 
effective rate of 0.75 on petrol discussed above. 
Two commodity groups do not attract any form of indirect tax. Overseas Travel 
(Group 1) is zero rated and therefore attracts a GST rate of zero per cent, while Rent 
(Group 2) is exempt from GST. Recreational Vehicles (Group 3) and Vehicle Purchases 
(Group 4) do attract GST but for both groups, the HES includes expenditures on second-
hand vehicles, which are exempt. The majority of commodity groups attract the standard 
GST rate of 12.5 per cent. Alcohol, Petrol and Tobacco (Groups 20 to 22) all attract excise 
taxes in addition to GST. The excise rates are clearly substantial, with the effective ad 
valorem tax rate on tobacco falling just short of 240 per cent. 
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 The weights were computed using expenditure data on each commodity.  
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Table 1 – Commodity Groups and Effective Ad Valorem Tax Rates 
No.  Commodity Group  Tax Rate (%)    No.  Commodity Group   Tax Rate (%) 
1 Overseas  Travel  0    12 Household  Services  12.5 
2 Rent  0    13 Adult’s  Clothing  12.5 
      14 Children’s  Clothing  12.5 
3 Recreational  Vehicles  6.3    15  Public Transport in NZ  12.5 
4 Vehicle  Purchases  7.1    16  Vehicle Supplies, Parts etc  12.5 
      17  Medical, Cosmetic etc  12.5 
5 Food  12.5    18 Services  12.5 
6  Food Outside Home  12.5    19 Other  Expenditure  12.5 
7  Pay to Local Authorities  12.5        
8 House  Maintenance  12.5        
9  Domestic Fuel and Power  12.5    20 Alcohol  46.8 
10 Household  Equipment  12.5    21 Petrol    71.8 
11 Furnishings  12.5    22 Tobacco  239.8 
 
Changes in effective rates must be translated into proportionate price changes. In 
general, suppose that the tax-exclusive ad valorem tax rate imposed on good i  is denoted 
i t , which is equivalent to a tax-inclusive rate of  ( ) 1 ii tt / +.  The revenue,  i R , from this 
indirect tax is equal to expenditure multiplied by the tax-inclusive rate. If  i t  is increased by 
the proportional rate,  i t   , the resulting proportionate increase in the price of the i th good, 









= ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
   
 (5) 
The price changes can then be used to obtain the required welfare changes. In the 
case of the existing tax structure, the ‘initial’ tax rate is obviously zero, so the proportional 
price change is the actual tax rate.  
3 Household  Expenditure  Data 
 
The welfare and redistributive measures were computed using data collected from 
households participating in the 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 2001 Household Economic 
Surveys (HES).
7
 The data set consists of the reported weekly expenditure on each 
commodity group for each household, from which the budget shares were computed. The 
expenditure data were adjusted to 2001 prices using the consumer price index (CPI). 
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 Surveys have only been conducted tri-annually since 1998.   
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There were very few changes in indirect tax rates over this period. The surveys were then 
pooled to form one large database, providing approximately 13,500 households.  
Each household was placed into one of the eighteen household groups shown in 
Table 2.
8
 The groups were further sub-divided into smoking and non-smoking households. 
A positive weekly expenditure on tobacco was sufficient for a household to be designated 
as a smoking household. The division into smoking and non-smoking households was 
found to improve substantially the fit of the estimated budget share relationships 
discussed in the appendix. Table 2 shows the number of households in each group 
together with their mean level of total weekly expenditure. As explained in the appendix, 
welfare measures are derived from the Linear Expenditure System. The preferences of 
each household are unique to the household’s total expenditure level and demographic 
group. 
 
Table 2 – Household Groups 
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 For the second group, the age refers to that of the ‘head of the household’. 
No.  Household Group  Number of Households  Mean Total Expenditure ($) 
   Smoking  Non-Smoking  Smoking  Non-Smoking 
1  65+ Single  16       1282  267  274 
2  65+ Couple  224       1191  498  540 
3  Single Adult & No Children  384       1098  406  437 
4  Single Adult & 1 Child  148       239  400  403 
5  Single Adult & 2 Children  148       181  428  438 
6  Single Adult & 3 Children  59       75  468  475 
7  Single Adult & 4+ Children  33       39  501  539 
8  Adult Couple & No Children  966       2036  690  766 
9  Adult Couple & 1 Child  381  643  668  763 
10  Adult Couple & 2 Children  435  916  707  896 
11  Adult Couple & 3 Children  207  458  805  844 
12  Adult Couple & 4+ Children  98  195  673  822 
13  3 Adults & No Children  319  456  975  992 
14  3 Adults & 1 Child  122  157  898  1038 
15  3 Adults & 2+ Children  117  134  826  920 
16  4+ Adults & No Children  179  192  1311  1282 
17  4+ Adults & 1 Child  65  60  1110  1129 
18  4+ Adults & 2+ Children  47  47  1070  925 
 Total  4093  9399      
7
4  Welfare Effects of Existing Indirect Taxes 
 
This section examines the welfare effects of New Zealand’s current indirect tax system. 
The starting point was an economy with no indirect taxes. The current schedule, as shown 
in Table 1, was then imposed and the resulting welfare changes analysed. This was 
accomplished by moving in the opposite direction and imposing a set of proportional price 
reductions, equal to the current set of tax rates. The required equivalent variation resulting 
from the tax structure was therefore the negative of the compensating variation produced 
by the set of price reductions.  
In addition to equivalent variations, EV , it is useful to examine the welfare costs of 
the indirect tax system.
9
 Welfare cost, WC , provides a measure of efficiency loss and is 






=  (6)   
Further, the ratio of equivalent variation to total expenditure,  / EV m , can be used 
to examine the proportionate change in the money metric measure of utility when pre 
change prices are used as the reference set of prices. Therefore, the relationship between 
the ratio,  / EV m , and m  within each household group can be used to gauge the 
disproportionality of the welfare impact from imposing the current indirect tax system. The 
system is described as progressive when  / EV m  rises with m , and regressive when it 
falls with m .  
For each household group, measures of welfare change were computed for a 
range of total expenditure levels. The tax system was found to be regressive for multi-
adult smoking households. However among single adult smoking households, the system 
is progressive. Furthermore, the rate at which  / EVm  rises with total expenditure 
increases with the number of children in the household.  
Among the non-smoking households the effect of the current system was found to 
be ambiguous in terms of the behaviour of  / EV m. The tax system is generally regressive 
over lower levels of total expenditure, but becomes increasingly progressive over higher 
levels, particularly among single adult households and those with multiple children. 
Hence, when examining separate demographic groups, there is no strong evidence of a 
                                                  
9 The equivalent variation is used here as it simplifies the computation of efficiency measures: the excess burden based on the 
compensating variation would need to evaluate the tax change allowing for compensation. Furthermore, as mentioned below, the ratio 
of the equivalent variation to total expenditure is the proportional change in money metric utility, where the latter is based on pre-
reform prices.  
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regressive effect of indirect taxes: a more detailed analysis thus requires overall summary 
measures of inequality, as given in section 6 below. 
Summary welfare measures were computed for each household group, based on 
its arithmetic mean total expenditure level, m . The latter gives a representative indication 
of the likely welfare costs faced by each household group, and enables between-group 
comparisons to be made more easily. These results are reported in Table 3, where Tax 
describes the weekly amount of indirect tax paid by each household group based on m .  
The equivalent variation, as a ratio of m , varies among demographic groups. The 
range is from about 8 to 16 per cent. The ratio is in fact similar for most household groups, 
yet is notably smaller for single adult household groups with children and higher for 
pensioner households (Groups 1 and 2) who smoke. The ratio  / EV m is higher among 
smoking households in comparison with non-smoking households, with large differences 
in some cases (in particular, between smoking and non-smoking pensioners).  
For the majority of household groups, the welfare costs per dollar of tax raised are 
small, suggesting that the indirect tax system as a whole is relatively efficient at raising 
revenue. These welfare cost values are substantially lower than figures generally 
suggested for income tax revenue, for example, where there is an increasing marginal 
rate structure. However, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, smoking household groups do incur 
relatively higher welfare costs than their non-smoking counterparts. For every dollar of 
indirect tax paid, the efficiency losses incurred by smoking household groups range 
between about 2 and 8 cents, while for non-smoking households, these losses range 
between only about 1 and 4 cents.  
Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between the welfare costs 
incurred by smoking household groups and their mean total expenditure levels. 
Accordingly, pensioners and single adult household groups who have the lowest mean 
total expenditure levels incur the largest welfare costs. This correlation reflects the effects 
of the excise tax on tobacco, towards which poorer household groups devote larger 
fractions of their total weekly budget. This correlation is not observed among the non-
smoking household groups. 
  
9
Table 3 – Welfare Effects of the Current Indirect Tax System 
    Smoking Households  Non-Smoking Households 
No. Household  Group  m   Tax  / EVm WC      m Tax  / EVm WC 
1  65+ Single  267 42.23 0.1709 0.0805 274 29.49  0.1092 0.0142
2  65+ Couple  498 78.68 0.1656 0.0483 540 62.73  0.1181 0.0171
3  Single Adult & No Children  406 60.14 0.1567 0.0582 437 46.94  0.1092 0.0166
4  Single Adult & 1 Child  400 44.58 0.1165 0.0455 403 37.12  0.0938 0.0189
5  Single Adult & 2 Children  428 48.44 0.1195 0.0562 438 38.37  0.0896 0.0232
6  Single Adult & 3 Children  468 47.29 0.1096 0.0848 475 42.62  0.0914 0.0188
7  Single Adult & 4+ Children  501 51.82 0.1086 0.0498 539 45.17  0.0853 0.0177
8  Adult Couple & No Children  690 100.57 0.1509 0.0356 766 86.46 0.1145 0.0142
9  Adult Couple & 1 Child  668 92.52 0.1448 0.0452 763 85.17  0.1131 0.0128
10  Adult Couple & 2 Children  707 94.33 0.1361 0.0197 896 102.44  0.1157 0.0118
11  Adult Couple & 3 Children  805 106.71 0.1355 0.0223 844 96.12 0.1149 0.0091
12  Adult Couple & 4+ Children  673 92.90 0.1432 0.0375 822 90.84  0.1141 0.0326
13  3 Adults & No Children  975 139.50 0.1468 0.0262 992 114.24 0.1169 0.0154
14  3 Adults & 1 Child  898 127.99 0.1464 0.0270 1038 121.04 0.1182 0.0132
15  3 Adults & 2+ Children  826 116.38 0.1496 0.0620 920 102.96 0.1162 0.0381
16  4+ Adults & No Children  1311 173.93 0.1349 0.0167 1282 147.83 0.1172 0.0162
17  4+ Adults & 1 Child  1110 168.93 0.1574 0.0345 1129 130.73 0.1207 0.0428
18  4+ Adults & 2+ Children  1070 145.72 0.1412 0.0371 925 105.96 0.1158 0.0109
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5  Revenue-Neutral Tax Reforms 
 
This section examines the welfare and redistributive effects of the revenue-neutral 
removal of excise taxes in New Zealand. For comparative purposes, two reforms are 
considered, both of which involve the removal of the alcohol and tobacco excise taxes. 
The petrol excise tax is retained in the first reform but removed in the second. Subsection 
5.1 provides the schedule of adjusted GST rates which are required to achieve revenue 
neutrality for each reform. The marginal welfare implications for each household group are 
analysed in subsection 5.2.  
5.1 Revenue  Neutrality 
 
For each reform the standard GST rate was raised to ensure that the total amount of 
indirect tax paid by households remained constant, allowing for the changes in demands 
following the relative price changes. This involved the use of an iterative search 
procedure. It was found that to support the revenue-neutral removal of the alcohol and 
tobacco excise taxes, the standard GST rate would need to rise from 12.5 to 14.4 per 
cent. The corresponding rates on Recreational Vehicles and Vehicle Purchases (groups 3 
and 4 in Table 1) increase to 8.1 and 8.9 per cent respectively, while by assumption the 
Mean Weekly Expenditure ($) 
11
effective rate of petrol tax was fixed at 71.8 per cent.
10
 When in addition, the petrol excise 
tax is removed the required GST rate rises to 15.9 per cent (with the rates on commodity 
groups 3 and 4 increasing to 9.7 and 10.5 per cent respectively).  
5.2 Welfare  Results 
 
Measures of welfare change were computed for a range of total expenditure levels for 
each household type. When examining tax reforms, the appropriate concept is the 
marginal excess burdens, MEB , defined as:  
  MEB EV T = −∆  (7) 
where  T ∆  is the change in the amount of indirect tax paid. The closely related measure of 
marginal welfare cost, MWC , is obtained by scaling the marginal excess burden by the 








In cases where households pay less tax as a result of a reform and are better off, the 
equivalent variation is negative and the efficiency gain is that remaining after 
(hypothetically) returning the tax ‘rebate’. As marginal welfare cost measures the gain per 
dollar of (reduced) revenue, the marginal excess burden must be divided by the absolute 
tax change. Thus a negative value for MWC  denotes an efficiency gain. 
In terms of the equity effects of the reforms, it was found that with the alcohol and 
tobacco excise taxes removed, the ratio of  / EV m  increased with total expenditure within 
all smoking household groups. This suggests that the reform is progressive for smoking 
households. In contrast, the reform produced profiles of the ratio that appeared non-
monotonic for the majority of non-smoking households, for whom the ratio of  / EV m  
showed no systematic rise or fall with total expenditure. The additional removal of the 
petrol excise tax caused no substantial changes in the progressivity of the reform for 
smoking households. However, for non-smoking households, the removal of the petrol 
excise tax prompted substantial increases in  / EV m  with total expenditure within each 
group. This led the reform to appear progressive for the majority of non-smoking 
household groups. Further analysis of equity effects is provided in section 6. 
  The present section therefore concentrates on comparisons between demographic 
groups, so that welfare measures were again computed based on each group’s arithmetic 
mean total expenditure level, m . The use of the mean expenditure levels provides more 
representative indications as to the likely levels of welfare change faced by each 
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 The excise tax on petrol was considered to be lowered sufficiently to counter the rise in the standard GST  
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household type. Tables 4 and 5 report the summary welfare measures for the first and 
second reforms respectively.  
For both reforms, all smoking household types experience reductions in the 
amount of weekly indirect tax paid, with the largest reductions obtained by households 
with three or more adults. The smallest reductions are gained by household groups with 
single adults. Although all non-smoking household groups incur increases in tax paid, 
these are generally small in size. The absolute differences in tax for the smoking and non-
smoking households is explained by the fact that there are many more of the latter groups 
of household. The revenue-neutral removal of the alcohol and tobacco excise taxes 
generates increases in tax paid for non-smoking households that rise with the number of 
adults in the household. However, the removal of all excise taxes leads household groups 
with three or more adults to experience smaller increases in tax paid relative to other 
groups.  
Figures 3 and 4 plot the indirect tax paid under the current schedule of indirect 
taxes (Table 3) against the changes in tax paid which result from the revenue-neutral 
removal of the alcohol and tobacco excise taxes for smoking and non-smoking household 
groups respectively. Among smoking household groups, those currently paying the largest 
amounts of indirect tax stand to experience the greatest reductions in tax paid. However 
as Figure 4 shows, these reductions are funded primarily by the non-smoking household 
groups which already pay the largest amounts of indirect tax under the current schedule.  
The welfare gains experienced by smoking household groups were similar for both 
reforms and lay primarily between two and six per cent of the groups’ mean weekly 
expenditure level. Household groups containing one and two adults with no children 
enjoyed the largest welfare gains as a fraction of their mean total expenditure. The welfare 
losses which were incurred by all non-smoking household groups were trivial in size, 
typically forming less than one per cent.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
rate to ensure the effective ad valorem tax rate on petrol remained constant.   
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Table 4 – Marginal Welfare Changes from the Revenue-Neutral Removal of the Alcohol 
and Tobacco Excise Taxes  
   Smoking  Households  Non-Smoking  Households 
No. Household  Group  m      T ∆   / EVm   MWC    m      T ∆   / EVm        MWC  
1  65+ Single  267 -12.02 -0.0673 -0.4950   274 2.91  0.0116 0.0928
2  65+ Couple  498 -15.99 -0.0445 -0.3859 540 4.76  0.0095 0.0735
      
3  Single Adult & No Children  406 -15.32 -0.0519 -0.3760 437 3.41  0.0083 0.0587
4  Single Adult & 1 Child  400 -6.47 -0.0203 -0.2566 403 3.48  0.0093 0.0718
5  Single Adult & 2 Children  428 -6.74 -0.0216 -0.3694 438 3.80  0.0095 0.0921
6  Single Adult & 3 Children  468 -5.38 -0.0190 -0.6561 475 4.46  0.0103 0.0987
7  Single Adult & 4+ Children  501 -2.65 -0.0096 -0.8226 539 4.35  0.0088 0.0943
8  Adult Couple & No Children  690 -17.88 -0.0339 -0.3082 766 5.43  0.0074 0.0460
9  Adult Couple & 1 Child  668 -14.91 -0.0310 -0.3870 763 6.94  0.0098 0.0749
10  Adult Couple & 2 Children  707 -11.05 -0.0217 -0.3910 896 8.57  0.0103 0.0817
11  Adult Couple & 3 Children  805 -9.94 -0.0163 -0.3189 844 8.45  0.0109 0.0899
12  Adult Couple & 4+ Children  673 -10.87 -0.0227 -0.4039 822 9.59  0.0131 0.1251
      
13  3 Adults & No Children  975 -18.97 -0.0250 -0.2826 992 7.10  0.0074 0.0352
14  3 Adults & 1 Child  898 -16.89 -0.0246 -0.3073 1038 9.62  0.0101 0.0852
15  3 Adults & 2+ Children  826 -13.57 -0.0236 -0.4363 920 9.30  0.0113 0.1161
      
16  4+ Adults & No Children  1311 -19.37 -0.0177 -0.1982 1282 8.55  0.0068 0.0199
17  4+ Adults & 1 Child  1110 -23.87 -0.0254 -0.1789 1129 10.61  0.0103 0.1008
18  4+ Adults & 2+ Children  1070 -16.99 -0.0222 -0.3949 925 9.64  0.0116 0.1089
 
Table 5 – Marginal Welfare Changes from the Revenue-Neutral Removal of the Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Petrol Excise Taxes  
                   Smoking Households              Non-Smoking Households 
No. Household  Group  m   T ∆     / EVm   MWC    m T ∆     / EVm      MWC  
1 65+  Single  267  -11.04 -0.0640 -0.5480 274 3.95  0.0151 0.0456
2 65+  Couple  498  -16.47 -0.0471 -0.4250 540 4.91  0.0088 -0.0285
      
3  Single Adult & No Children  406  -16.02 -0.0556 -0.4101 437 2.86  0.0060 -0.0874
4  Single Adult & 1 Child  400  -7.44 -0.0244 -0.3132 403 2.82  0.0066 -0.0532
5  Single Adult & 2 Children  428  -7.97 -0.0265 -0.4228 438 3.65  0.0081 -0.0219
6  Single Adult & 3 Children  468  -5.56 -0.0210 -0.7644 475 4.76  0.0100 -0.0063
7  Single Adult & 4+ Children  501  -2.27 -0.0110 -1.4361 539 2.75  0.0053 0.0473
8  Adult Couple & No Children  690  -19.74 -0.0381 -0.3303 766 4.58  0.0055 -0.0852
9  Adult Couple & 1 Child  668  -17.24 -0.0366 -0.4182 763 6.50  0.0083 -0.0231
10  Adult Couple & 2 Children  707  -12.54 -0.0252 -0.4211 896 8.85  0.0101 0.0260
11  Adult Couple & 3 Children  805  -11.51 -0.0192 -0.3440 844 8.76  0.0108 0.0445
12  Adult Couple & 4+ Children  673  -14.35 -0.0301 -0.4105 822 9.76  0.0129 0.0861
13  3 Adults & No Children  975  -22.12 -0.0297 -0.3092 992 4.58  0.0038 -0.1659
14  3 Adults & 1 Child  898  -19.23 -0.0285 -0.3323 1038 7.59  0.0073 0.0040
15  3 Adults & 2+ Children  826  -18.47 -0.0325 -0.4543 920 7.83  0.0085 -0.0051
16  4+ Adults & No Children  1311  -24.84 -0.0229 -0.2093 1282 5.37  0.0031 -0.2551
17  4+ Adults & 1 Child  1110  -33.18 -0.0363 -0.2140 1129 6.99  0.0057 -0.0858
18  4+ Adults & 2+ Children  1070  -22.62 -0.0296 -0.4010 925 5.58  0.0056 -0.0627 
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Tables 4 and 5 also provide the marginal welfare costs of both reforms. Excise 
taxes create efficiency losses by distorting the prices of the affected commodities relative 
to other commodity prices. The elimination of all excise taxes reduces these distortions, 
which lead the majority of household groups to experience marginal welfare benefits. 
However, both reforms also entail raising the rate of GST to achieve revenue neutrality. 
As the rate of GST rises, the commodities groups Rent and Overseas Travel (Groups 1 
and 2 in Table 1) remain, respectively, exempt and zero rated. Hence, the reforms enlarge  
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the distortions between the prices of these commodities relative to those which attract 
GST. This counters the efficiency gains which stem from the removal of the excise taxes 
and leads some non-smoking household groups to incur marginal welfare costs or 
efficiency losses. This is particularly true of the first reform, in which the petrol excise tax 
is retained.  
  For both reforms, all smoking household groups experience substantial marginal 
welfare benefits. For every dollar reduction in tax paid, the revenue-neutral removal of all 
excise taxes leads smoking households groups to experience efficiency gains ranging 
between about 20 and 50 cents. However, for single adult households with three or more 
children these are much higher, despite the fact that they devote the smallest budget 
shares to alcohol, tobacco and petrol. This counterintuitive result may be explained by the 
resulting small reduction in tax paid by these household groups, so that the denominator 




The revenue-neutral removal of the alcohol and tobacco excise taxes leads all 
non-smoking household groups to incur marginal welfare costs. However, these costs are 
of a trivial size. Furthermore, the removal of the petrol excise tax leads two thirds of all 
non-smoking household groups to acquire small gains in efficiency. Thus, these 
household groups experience increases in efficiency despite paying more tax. In contrast 
to smoking household groups, non-smoking household groups with no children incur the 
smallest marginal welfare costs and largest marginal welfare benefits from the first and 
second reforms respectively. Non-smoking household groups with multiple children feared 
worst, sustaining the largest efficiency losses. No significant correlations were found 
between the budget shares which non-smoking household groups devote to the excise 
commodities and either the groups’ changes in tax paid or their marginal welfare costs. 
The marginal changes in welfare are more varied across the smoking household groups 
than the non-smoking household groups.  
6  Indirect Taxes and Inequality 
 
It was found in the previous section that the analysis of ratios of equivalent variations to 
total expenditure does not generally give an unambiguous indication of the overall 
progressivity or otherwise of excise tax reforms.
12
 This section therefore considers the 
equity effects of the excise tax reforms by examining overall measures of inequality, both 
within demographic groups and over all households combined. When examining 
                                                  
11For both reforms, the efficiency gains of smoking household groups typically rise with the number of children, while at the same time 
the reductions in tax paid fall.  
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households with differing demographic compositions, it is necessary to use some kind of 
adult equivalence scale. In measuring inequality, it is clearly not appropriate simply to use 
a measure of total expenditure net of indirect taxes, since these do not accurately reflect 
welfare changes. Furthermore, a measure of inequality must be chosen. These issues are 
considered in subsection 6.1, and results are reported in subsection 6.2. Sensitivity 
analyses are undertaken in subsection 6.3. 
6.1 Money  Metric  Measures and Equivalence Scales 
 
The analysis here uses a money metric measure of each household’s utility to measure 
‘wellbeing’. The money metric,  e m , is defined as the level of total expenditure that, at a set 
of reference prices, gives the same utility as the actual total expenditure. This money 
metric ensures that alternative situations are evaluated using a common set of reference 
prices, and it is invariant with respect to monotonic transformations of utility. When the 
vector of pre-reform prices, 
0 p , is used as the reference set of prices, the pre-reform and 





e mm =  (9) 
 
1
e mm E V =−  (10) 
  Measures of inequality are designed for populations that are demographically 
homogenous. However, populations are comprised of households that have a variety of 
different demographic structures.
 
Achieving the required homogeneity to compute the 
inequality measures involves creating, as Ebert (1997, p.235) aptly put it, ‘an (artificial) 
income distribution for a fictitious population’. The artificial income distribution is created 
by scaling the money metric measure of utility by an adult equivalence scale, h . The 
resulting distribution,  / e zmh = , provides a measure of ‘wellbeing’ that is comparable 
across all individuals in a population.
14
 The present analysis uses the two-parameter 
equivalence scale, which takes the form: 
  () ac hn n
α θ =+  (11) 
where  a n  and  c n  are the number of adults and children in the household respectively. The 
parameter  θ  measures the size of children relative to adults, and the term α  reflects 
economies of scale in consumption. On the use of this form, see Jenkins and Cowell 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 The ratio EV/m gives only a local measure of progressivity.  
13 The proportionate change in money metric utility is conveniently the ratio of the equivalent variation to total expenditure – which 
provides a rationale for the earlier discussion of local progressivity in terms of the variation in this ratio with total expenditure. 
14
 For within-group inequality, the equivalence scale chosen only affects the calculations for household groups: 7, 12 and 15-18 (see 
Table 1) which do not contain a homogenous number of adults and children.   
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(1994, p.894). The results reported here use the values  0.65 θ =  and  0.75 α = . These 
values are roughly ‘mid-range’ values of a large number of scales used and examined in 
Creedy and Sleeman (2004). However, sensitivity results are also reported below. 
  The fictitious population is created by selecting a unit of analysis for which the 
inequality measures are calculated. Possible units include the household, the equivalent 
adult and the individual. The present analysis uses the individual. The inequality measure 
reported is the Atkinson measure of inequality.
15
 This is based on the social welfare 

















where  i n  is the number of individuals in the  th i  household ( ) 1, , iN = …  and  ( ) Vz is 












for  1 ε ≠ , and  ( ) log Vz z =  when  1 ε = . The parameter ε  reflects the policymaker’s 
aversion to inequality. The following subsection reports results for ε  of 1.2, which 
represents substantial aversion to inequality, though sensitivity analyses are also 
discussed. The equally distributed equivalent, z   , is the money metric which, if received by 
every individual, would give the same level of social welfare, W , as the actual distribution.  
The Atkinson measure of inequality is the proportional difference between the arithmetic 










Pre-reform and post-reform measures of inequality are generated for each household 
group and for all households combined. The percentage difference between the pre and 
post-reform measures provides an indication of the redistributive effect of the tax reforms.  
6.2 Tax  Reforms  and Inequality 
 
Tables 6 and 7 report the pre-reform and post-reform values of the Atkinson inequality 
measure for the first and second reforms respectively. For both reforms, all smoking 
                                                  
15 A range of extended Gini measures were also computed, but gave similar results.   
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household groups experience reductions in inequality. For the revenue-neutral removal of 
all excise taxes, these reductions range from 0.1 to 8.6 per cent. Smoking household 
groups with two or more adults have greater reductions in inequality from the second as 
opposed to the first reform. These household groups were found to devote the largest 
budget shares to petrol. In contrast, smoking household groups with one adult, which 
devote smaller budget shares to petrol, generally experience larger reductions in 
inequality from the revenue-neutral removal of just the alcohol and tobacco excise taxes.  
  Among the non-smoking household groups, the removal of the alcohol and 
tobacco excise taxes causes the majority to incur a slight increase in inequality. However, 
the additional removal of the petrol excise tax leads to all but one non-smoking household 
group experiencing a reduction in inequality. As with the welfare results, the percentage 
changes in inequality for the smoking household groups exhibit greater variation than 
those for the non-smoking household groups.  
  The overall reductions in inequality are small, as these are dominated by the non-
smoking households, which incur some of the smallest reductions and in some cases 
increases in inequality from the reforms. However, the overall reduction in inequality 
approximately doubles when the petrol excise tax is removed.  
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Table 6 - Atkinson Inequality Measures for the Revenue-Neutral Removal of the Alcohol 
and Tobacco Excise Taxes  
No. Household  Group  Atkinson Inequality Measure ( 1.2 ε = ) 
   Smoking  Households   Non-Smoking  Households 
      Pre:  Post:  %∆:    Pre:  Post:  %∆: 
1 65+  Single  0.1567 0.1502 -4.1481 0.1695  0.1700  0.2950
2 65+  Couple  0.1044 0.1001 -4.1188 0.1733  0.1736  0.1731
3  Single Adult & No Children  0.1804 0.1728 -4.2129 0.1928  0.1929  0.0519
4  Single Adult & 1 Child  0.0876 0.0849 -3.0822 0.1310  0.1313  0.2290
5  Single Adult & 2 Children  0.1027 0.1001 -2.5316 0.1318  0.1315  -0.2276
6  Single Adult & 3 Children  0.1140 0.1131 -0.7895 0.1270  0.1267  -0.2362
7  Single Adult & 4+ Children  0.0722 0.0708 -1.9391 0.1162  0.1158  -0.3442
8  Adult Couple & No Children  0.1285 0.1230 -4.2802 0.1670  0.1671  0.0599
9  Adult Couple & 1 Child  0.1237 0.1189 -3.8804 0.1658  0.1659  0.0603
10  Adult Couple & 2 Children  0.1072 0.1039 -3.0784 0.1749  0.1749  0.0000
11  Adult Couple & 3 Children  0.1656 0.1592 -3.8647 0.1463  0.1462  -0.0684
12  Adult Couple & 4+ Children  0.1236 0.1206 -2.4272 0.1411  0.1409  -0.1417
13  3 Adults & No Children  0.1354 0.1305 -3.6189 0.1387  0.1392  0.3605
14  3 Adults & 1 Child  0.1284 0.1231 -4.1277 0.1387  0.1385  -0.1442
15  3 Adults & 2+ Children  0.1269 0.1226 -3.3885 0.1474  0.1473  -0.0678
16  4+ Adults & No Children  0.1120 0.1085 -3.1250 0.1122  0.1127  0.4456
17  4+ Adults & 1 Child  0.1120 0.1047 -6.5179 0.2092  0.2098  0.2868
18  4+ Adults & 2+ Children  0.1675 0.1619 -3.3433   0.1748  0.1743  -0.2860
   Overall  Pre: 0.1739  Post: 0.1724  %∆: -0.8626 
 
Table 7 - Atkinson Inequality Measures for the Revenue-Neutral Removal of the Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Petrol Excise Taxes  
No. Household  Group  Atkinson Inequality Measure ( 1.2 ε = ) 
   Smoking  Households   Non-Smoking  Households 
      Pre:  Post:  %∆:    Pre:  Post:  %∆: 
1 65+  Single  0.1567 0.1510 -3.6375 0.1695  0.1701  0.3540
2 65+  Couple  0.1044 0.1001 -4.1188 0.1733  0.1728  -0.2885
3  Single Adult & No Children  0.1804 0.1731 -4.0466 0.1928  0.1914  -0.7261
4  Single Adult & 1 Child  0.0876 0.0847 -3.3105 0.1310  0.1298  -0.9160
5  Single Adult & 2 Children  0.1027 0.1005 -2.1422 0.1318  0.1316  -0.1517
6  Single Adult & 3 Children  0.1140 0.1137 -0.2632 0.1270  0.1265  -0.3937
7  Single Adult & 4+ Children  0.0722 0.0721 -0.1385 0.1162  0.1140  -1.8933
8  Adult Couple & No Children  0.1285 0.1217 -5.2918 0.1670  0.1652  -1.0778
9  Adult Couple & 1 Child  0.1237 0.1184 -4.2846 0.1658  0.1640  -1.0856
10  Adult Couple & 2 Children  0.1072 0.1027 -4.1978 0.1749  0.1725  -1.3722
11  Adult Couple & 3 Children  0.1656 0.1562 -5.6763 0.1463  0.1442  -1.4354
12  Adult Couple & 4+ Children  0.1236 0.1197 -3.1553 0.1411  0.1392  -1.3466
13  3 Adults & No Children  0.1354 0.1287 -4.9483 0.1387  0.1373  -1.0094
14  3 Adults & 1 Child  0.1284 0.1210 -5.7632 0.1387  0.1360  -1.9466
15  3 Adults & 2+ Children  0.1269 0.1217 -4.0977 0.1474  0.1461  -0.8820
16  4+ Adults & No Children  0.1120 0.1063 -5.0893 0.1122  0.1113  -0.8021
17  4+ Adults & 1 Child  0.1120 0.1024 -8.5714 0.2092  0.2084  -0.3824
18  4+ Adults & 2+ Children  0.1675 0.1600 -4.4776   0.1748  0.1717  -1.7735
   Overall  Pre: 0.1739  Post: 0.1710  %∆: -1.6676  
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6.3 Sensitivity  Analyses 
 
This subsection analyses the sensitivity of the Atkinson measure of inequality to the 
parameters of the equivalence scale, θ  and α , along with the degree of inequality 
aversion. The sensitivity analysis is based on the percentage reduction in the overall 
measure of inequality that results from the revenue-neutral removal of all three excise 
taxes. Figure 5 shows the sensitivity of the reductions in overall inequality to the weight 
attached to children, θ , while the economies of scale parameter, α , is held fixed at 0.75. 
Conversely, figure 6 shows the sensitivity to the economies of scale parameter, α , 
holding θ  fixed at 0.65. In both figures, inequality measures are given for three levels of 
aversion to inequality,  0.2,0.6,1.2 ε = .
16
 
  All values of the parameters continued to produce reductions in the overall level of 
Atkinson inequality. However, the magnitudes of these reductions varied greatly. Figure 5 
shows that the percentage reduction in overall inequality falls as the weight attached to 
children increases. In contrast, figure 6 shows that the relationship between the 
percentage reduction in inequality and the economies of scale parameter is a relatively flat 
U-shape. Increases from the  0.75 α =  used earlier lead to smaller percentage reductions 
in inequality, while reductions in α , below about 0.4, also lead to smaller reductions in 
inequality.  
Both figures show that the pattern of inequality reductions is similar for different 
degrees of inequality aversion, though the absolute levels change. A lower aversion to 
inequality is associated with a larger percentage reduction in inequality. The lower 
aversion also increases the sensitivity of the Atkinson inequality measure to changes in 
the upper ranges of the distribution.  
 
                                                  
16 The lower value of 0.2 corresponds to that found among economics students by Amiel et al. (1999) using surveys.  The higher value 
represents substantial aversion, in terms of the tolerance of a ‘leaky bucket’ in making transfers from rich to poor (for example, in 
taking $1 from one person and transferring it to someone with half the income, an aversion coefficient of 2 implies that a leak of 75 
cents is tolerated).    
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Following a recommendation of McCleod et al (2001), this paper has analysed the welfare 
and redistributive effects of the revenue-neutral removal of excise taxes in New Zealand. 
Welfare and redistributive measures were computed for thirty-six demographic groups, 






























































Surveys. By enabling parameters to vary with total household expenditure levels, this 
approach allowed for considerable preference heterogeneity.  
  New Zealand’s current system of indirect taxes was found to be relatively efficient 
at raising tax revenue, having generally low marginal welfare costs per dollar of revenue 
raised. However, smoking household groups incur larger welfare costs than their non-
smoking counterparts, reflecting the high effective tax rate on tobacco. The standard GST 
rate required to support the revenue-neutral removal of the alcohol and tobacco excise 
taxes was found to be 14.4 per cent. If in addition the petrol excise tax is removed, the 
required GST rate rises to 15.9 per cent. The direction and magnitude of the welfare and 
redistributive effects of the reforms was found to vary substantially among household 
groups. Smoking households experienced relatively larger efficiency gains and greater 
reductions in inequality than non-smoking households. The increases in the standard GST 
rate required to achieve revenue neutrality enlarged the distortions between the prices of 
the commodity groups which attract GST relative to the two commodity groups which do 
not attract GST. These countered the efficiency gains generated by the removal of the 
excise taxes and led some non-smoking household groups to incur efficiency losses from 
the reforms. For both reforms, the large reductions in tax paid that were acquired by 
smoking household groups were found to be primarily funded by those non-smoking 
household groups who already pay the largest amounts of indirect tax under the current 
schedule.  
  McCleod et al. (2001) argued that excise taxes were both inequitable and 
inefficient. Dismissing other arguments widely used to justify these taxes, they 
recommended their abolition. The present paper has found marginal welfare gains for 
such a reform to be of the order of about 40 cents per dollar of (reduced) tax revenue for 
smoking households, and only 5 cents per dollar of tax revenue for non-smoking 
households. Comparable estimates for other taxes are not available, and it would be 
interesting to compare these welfare effects, particularly for smoking households, with 
those arising from income taxation. In terms of equity, the overall reduction in inequality 
(of money metric utility per adult equivalent) resulting from the proposed reform was found 
to be around the range of 1.5 to 2.5 per cent, depending on the degree of inequality 
aversion and the parameters used in the adult equivalence scale. However, these overall 
results conceal larger variations within particular household groups. Any policy decision in 
this context must of course balance these findings against perceived advantages, 
including environmental and health considerations. Policy views must inevitably depend 
on value judgements, but it is hoped that the findings of this paper can contribute towards 
rational debate on the subject, rather than relying on guesswork. 
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Appendix: Demands and Welfare Changes 
 
This appendix outlines the approach taken to evaluate the welfare and redistributive 
effects of the proposed indirect-tax reforms.
17
 The demand responses of households to 
price changes are modelled using the Linear Expenditure System (LES), which has direct 
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where  i x  denotes consumption of the  th i  good and  i γ  is committed consumption with 
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total expenditure and  i p  denotes the price of good i . The indirect utility function takes the 
form:  
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  Consider a change in the vector of prices from 
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1 p  resulting from an indirect-
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If  i p    denotes the change in the effective ad valorem tax rate on the  th i  good, then 
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 This section summarises the approach described in Creedy (1998a and 1998b).  

































=+ ∏    (5) 
The computation of the welfare measures thus requires expressions for both the 
parameter,  i β  and committed expenditure,  ii pγ .  
  For the LES,  ii i ew β = , where  i e  denotes the total expenditure elasticity and  i w  is 
the budget share for the  th i  good,  ( )/ ii i wp x m = . Reported budget shares that are 
obtained from sample surveys have too much sampling variability to be used directly and 
commonly give rise to spurious negative total expenditure elasticities. A flexible 
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The parameters,  1i δ ,  2i δ  and  3i δ  are estimated using equation (6), which has the 
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Committed expenditure in the LES can be written as: 














where  ii η  denotes the own-price elasticity of demand for good i. Using a result 
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19 A total of 792 regressions were carried out (for 36 household types and 22 commodity groups), so the results cannot be presented 
here. Good fits have also been found using Australian data; see Creedy (1998b). The budget share relationship used here is an 
extension of that behind the AIDS model, which omits the term in the reciprocal of total expenditure.   
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where ξ  denotes the Frisch parameter, defined as the elasticity of the marginal utility of 
total expenditure with respect to total expenditure. The Frisch parameter cannot be 
calculated within the model and instead must be determined from extraneous information. 
The analysis was conducted using a fixed Frisch parameter of -1.9. Experiments with 
varying Frisch parameters, allowing the absolute Frisch to fall as total expenditure rises, 
showed that the results were not sensitive. Hence only the constant case is reported here. 
Tulpule and Powell (1978) used a value of  1.82 ξ = −  when calculating elasticities at 
average income for Australia, based on the work of Williams (1978), and this value was 
adopted by Dixon et al. (1982) in calibrating a general equilibrium model. The slightly 
higher absolute value was used here to avoid some negative committed expenditures.  
  The budget shares allocated by each household group to a given commodity were 
regressed on the set of total weekly expenditure levels for that group using the HES data. 
This was repeated for each of the 22 commodity groups. Hence, a total of 792 (22x18x2) 
budget share regressions were performed. For any given household, the parameters of 
their direct utility function (β  and γ ) are unique to both the household’s total expenditure 
level as well as their demographic make-up. This approach enables considerable 
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